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STATE OF UTAH 
JACK H. BOWMAN and 
EMMETT RIGNEY, dba 
HUSTLER'S MARKET, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
;;, Municipal Corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
10535 
This appeal involves the question of whether Salt Lake 
City Ordinance, 20-5-1, et seq. is void and unenforceable. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was argued on stipulated facts to the Court 
and a final judgment was entered granting a permanent 
restraining order against enforcement of Salt Lake City 
Ordinance 20-5-1, et seq. declaring said ordinance void 
and unenforceable. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the lower court's final 
judgment and judgment in its favor as a matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Salt Lake City Ordinance, Title 20, Chapter 5, Sec. 
1 through 16 provides as follows: 
2 
AN ORDINANCE 
~ ORDI.NANCE AMENDING Title 20 of the Re. 
vis~d Ord~nances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1955, re-
latmg to licenses, by adding thereto a new Chapte 5 to be entitled, "Closing Sale." r 
Be it ordained by the Board of Commissioners of 
Salt Lake City, Utah: ' 
SECTION 1. That Title 20 of the Revised Ordinances 
of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1955, relating to licenses be 
and the same hereby is, amended by adding the~et~ 
a new Chapter 5 to be entitled, "Closing Sale," to 
read as follows: 
"CHAPTER 5 
"CLOSING SALE. 
"Sec. 20-5-1. Definitions. As used in this chapter, the ' 
following terms shall have the meanings herein 
stated: 
"(1) SALE. "Sale" shall mean: 
" (a) Any sale of, or any off er to sell to the public or 
any group thereof, goods, wares or merchandise on 
order, in transit or in stock, in connection with a de-
clared purpose as set forth by advertising that such 
sale is anticipatory to or for the purpose of terrnina· 
tion, liquidation, revision, windup, anticipatory re-
moval, dissolution or abandonment of the business or 
that portion of the business conducted at any loca· 
tion;and 
"(b) All sales advertised in any manner calcula~ 
to convey to the public the belief that upon the dis· 
posal of the goods to be placed on sale, the busines5 
or that portion thereof being conducted at any loca· 
tion will cease, be removed, interrupted, discon· 
tinued or changed; and 
3 
" ( c) All sales advertised to be 'Adjustor's Sale,' 'As-
signee's Sale,' 'Administrator's Sale,' 'Closing Sale,' 
·creditor's Sale,' 'End Sale,' 'Forced Out of Business 
Sale,' 'Going Out of Business Sale,' 'Insurance Sal-
vage Sale,' 'Last Days Sale,' 'Lease Expires Sale,' 
'Liquidation Sale,' 'Removal Sale,' 'Reorganization 
Sale,' 'Quitting Business Sale,' 'We Quit Sale,' 
"Wholesale Closing Out Sale,' 'Fixtures for Sale,' or 
advertised by any other expression or characteriza-
tion or phrase of like or similar language which 
would reasonably convey to the public that the sale 
is being conducted as a result of such occurrences as 
enumerated above, which are not intended to be all 
inclusive but refer to type or class of sale. 
" ( 2) PUBLISH, PUBLISHING, ADVERTISE-
MENT,ADVERTISING. 'Publish,' 'publishing,' 'ad-
vertisement,' 'advertising' shall mean any and all 
means of conveying to the public notice of sale or 
notice of intention to conduct a sale, whether by 
word of mouth, newspaper advertisement, magazine 
advertisement, handbill, written notice, printed 
notice, printed display, billboard display, poster, 
radio, or television announcement and any and all 
means including oral, written or printed. 
"Sec. 20-5-2. License required. It shall be unlawful 
for any person to publish or conduct any sale as de-
fined in this chapter without first obtaining a license 
to do so. This license shall be in addition to any other 
license which may be required by any other ordi-
nances. 
"Sec. 20-5-3. Fee. The fee for the license required by 
the preceding section shall be Twenty-Five and 
00/000 ($25.00) Dollars. 
"Sec. 20-5-4. Application. Application for such li-
cense shall be in writing, executed by the applicant 
4 
under oath and shall contain the following inforrna. 
tion: 1 
" ( 1) Type of sale to be conducted and reason for con. 
ducting such sale. 1 
"(2) A description of the place where such sale is to 
be held. 
"(3) The nature of the occupancy, whether by lease 
or sublease, and the date of termination of such oc-
cupancy. 
" ( 4) The means to be employed in publishing such 
sale, together with the text of any and all proposed 
advertising matter. 
" ( 5) An itemized list of the goods, wares and mer-
chandise to be offered for sale, including those on 
order and not received. 
"(6) Where and from whom such stock was pur-
chased or acquired; and, if not purchased, the man· 
ner of such acquisition. 
"(7) Any additional information that the license as-
sessor and collector may require. 
"Sec. 20-5-5. Year in business required prior to ~­
suance of license. Exception. No person, company or 
corporation shall be eligible for a license nor shall a 
license be issued to any person, company or corpor-
ation unless they shall have been previously licensed 
to do business at the same location of such closing 
sale for the 365-day period immediately preceding 
the beginning of the said sale except in those in; 
stances where a bona fide hardship would be createa 
and in such instances proof must be furnished to the 
license assessor and collector that: 
" ( 1) Such hardship exists; and 
5 
"(2) At the conclusion of such closing sale all and 
anv business transactions of that particular applicant 
will completely and permanently cease and desist. 
"Sec. 20-5-6. Issuance of license and term. Upon the 
filing of an application and a finding by the license 
assessor and collector after investigation that the 
statements contained therein appear to be true and 
are not false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading in 
any respect, a license shall be issued for a period not 
exceeding thirty ( 30) days, upon the payment of the 
fee herein prescribed. 
"Sec. 20-5-7. Renewals. Term and fee. Upon satisfac-
tory proof by the licensee that the stock itemized in 
the original application has not been entirely dis-
posed of, the license assessor and collector shall re-
new such license for a period of not exceeding thirty 
( 30) days. In no event shall a license be renewed 
more than twice. For each renewal a fee of Ten and 
00/00 ($10.00) Dollars shall be collected. 
"Sec. 20-5-8. Display of license. Upon commencement 
of any sale, and for the duration thereof, the license 
therefor shall be conspiculously displayed near the 
entrance to the premises. 
"Sec. 20-5-9. Revocation of license. A license granted 
pursuant to this chapter may be revoked by the li-
cense assessor and collector if: 
"(1) The licensee has failed to include in the inven-
tory required by the provisions of this chapter the 
goods, wares and merchandise, or any part thereof, 
required to be contained in such inventory. 
" ( 2) The licensee has added, caused to be added or 
permitted to be added, any goods, wares or mer-
chandise not described in the original inventory. 
6 
"(3) The licensee has violated any of the provisions 
of this chapter or of the laws pertaining to advertis-
ing. 
"Sec. 20-5-10. Rules and regulations. The license as- ' 
sessor and collector may make such rules and regula. 
tions for the conduct and advertisement of the sales 
defined in this chapter as may be necessary to carr. 
out the purposes thereof. Such rules and regulatio~ 
must be submitted to and be approved by the board 
of city commissioners. 
"Sec. 20-5-11. Mingling of goods prohibited. No per-
son contemplating conducting any sale as defined in 
this chapter or during the continuance of such sale 
shall order any goods, wares or merchandise for the 
purpose of selling them at such sale; and any unusual 
purchase or addition to the stock of such goods, , 
wares, or merchandise within sixty ( 60) days before 
the filing of such application for a license to conduct 
such sale shall be presumptive evidence that such 
purchase or addition was made in contemplation of 
such sale and for the purpose of selling it at such a 
sale. 
"Sec. 20-5-12. Each sale separate offense. Each saie 
made without a license and each sale of goods, wares · 
or merchandise that is not inventoried and described 
in the original application shall constitute a separate 
offense under this chapter. 
"Sec. 20-5-13. Resumption of business prohibited. ~o 
person shall, upon the conclusion of any sale h~rem 
defined, continue to conduct a business or busmess 
operation of the same or similar nature to that for 
the discontinuance of which such license was issued 
at the same premises; nor shall such person within 
one ( 1) year after conclusion of such sale resume ' 
such business at the same premises. 
7 
"Sec. 20-5-14. Records to be kept. The licensee shall 
keep suitable books and records and make them 
available at all times to the city license assessor and 
collector. 
"Sec. 20-5-15. Exemptions to chapter. The following 
persons shall be exempt from the scope and opera-
tion of this chapter: 
" ( 1) Persons acting pursuant to an order or process 
of a court of competent jurisdiction. 
''(2) Persons acting in accordance with their powers 
and duties as public officers such as sheriffs and mar-
shals. 
"Sec. 20-5-16. Compliance with chapter required. It 
shall be unlawful for any person to violate or fail 
to comply with any of the provisions of this chapter 
or any rule or regulation adopted pursuant thereto." 
SECTION 2. In the opinion of the Board of Commis-
sioners, it is necessary for the peace, health and safe-
ty of the inhabitants of Salt Lake City, Utah, that 
this ordinance become effective immediately. 
SECTION 3. This ordinance shall take effect upon its 
first publication. 
Passed by the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake 
City, Utah, this 5th day of March, 1964. 
HERMAN J. HOGENSEN, 
City Recorder. 
Bill No. 16 of 1964. 
Published March 12, 1964. 
J. BRACKEN LEE, 
Mayor. 
(C-32) 
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Respondent Emmett Rigney commenced the business 
of Hustler's Market at 958 North Eighth West Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, about March, 1964, and from that date 
to approximately October, 1965, suffered a continuous fi. 
nancial loss. Respondent Rigney determined to cease 
doing business and in November, 1965, contacted Re-
spondent Jack H. Bowman to purchase Rigney's grocery 
stock and conduct a "closing out sale" with the under-
standing that Respondent Bowman was to purchase addi-
tional merchandise inventory for purposes of selling at 
final sale. On about November 28, 1965, Respondents 
were contacted by the City Licensing Department and 
were informed of the provisions of Salt Lake City Ordi-
nance heretofore set out. 
Respondents being aware that their intentions were 
not in conformance with the ordinance determined it to 
be a useless act to apply for the license and decided to 1 
obtain a declaratory judgment of validity or invalidity of 
such ordinance. 
Plaintiffs have advertised the "quitting business sale" 
at the said Hustler's Market and Appellant by stipulation, 
1 
does not contend that there was anything false or fraud· 
ulent in the advertising as such advertisement may per· 
tain to the prices and the commodities listed therein. ' 
However, the Appellant does suggest that the full page ad 1 
with the caption across the top of the advertisement, 
"HUSTLER'S MARKET QUITS - GIGANTIC CLOSE 
OUT SALE - YOUR GAIN - SA VE - SA VE - SAVE," 
even with the information at the very bottom of the ad 1 
in small print that, "Stock will be supplemented to meet 1 
demand", is calculated to mislead the public. On Page 9 
BOOK MATCHES 
~~.~\ 10c 
I I-TO - ... -- 17 $1 SAUCE_ .. : ::-:. 
"" .. "'
1 
•;;--" 1 O $1 
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HUSTLERS 
MARKET 
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is a representative and typical advertisement Respond-
ents continually used, said fact having been stipulated to. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ARE EMPOWEREDTO 
ENACT ORDINANCES PROVIDING FOR, AMONG 1 
OTHER THINGS, THE REASONABLE, PROPER AND 
NECESSARY REGULATIONS OF A PARTICULAB 
CALLING OR BUSINESS AND THE GENERAL WEL-
FARE OF THE PUBLIC. 
It is submitted that such power is expressly conferred 
by statute. Title 10, Chapter 8, Section 39, 1953 Utah Code 
Annotated shows the following authority for municipal 
power: 
" ... they may license, tax and regulate the business 
conducted by merchants, wholesalers and retailers, 1 
shopkeepers and storekeepers . . . " 
The above section was held to confer power on the city 
municipality to "regulate" a particular calling or bus· 
iness. The test given for the validity of such "regulation" 1 
is that it is such: 
" ... reasonable regulation as may be deemed neces· 
sary and wholesome in conducting the business in a 
proper and orderly manner ... " Salt Lake City vs. 
Revene, 101 Utah 504, 124 Pacific 2nd 537. 
Title 10, Chapter 8, Section 84, 1953 Utah Code An· 
notated gives municipalities the following additional 
powers: 
11 
"They may pass all ordinances and rules, and make 
all regulations, not repugnant to law, necessary for 
carrying into effect or discharging all powers and 
duties conferred by this chapter, and such as are 
necessary and proper to provide for the safety and 
preserve the health, and promote the prosperity, im-
prove the morals, peace and good order, comfort and 
convenience of the city and the inhabitants there-
of ... " 
The above cited section is known and referred to as the 
·General Welfare Clause". Bohn v. Salt Lake City, 8 Pa-
cific 2nd 591. 
It can't be argued that the city may not pass ordinances 
designed to protect the public welfare and promote the 
public prosperity or that the city can not regulate the 
affairs of business by city ordinance; it can only be 
argued that a particular ordinance or regulation is un-
reasonable and improper, thereby becoming an unreason-
able extension of the proper exercise of police power. 
POINT II 
THE CITY ORDINANCE, 20-5-1 DESIGNATED, 
"CLOSING SALE", COVERING, " ... MERCHANTS, 
WHOLESALERS AND RETAILERS, SHOPKEEPERS 
AND STOREKEEPERS ... " IS A REASONABLE AND 
PROPER "REGULATION" TO PROMOTE "PUBLIC 
PROSPERITY", AND TO PROTECT "PUBLIC WEL-
FARE" AND HENCE WITHIN THE STATUTORY 
PEROGATIVE OF THE POLICE POWERS EXTENDED 
TO SALT LAKE CITY. 
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(a) The "Closing Sale" ordinance is authorized by ex. 
pressly delegated power given to the municipalitv 
to "license, tax and regulate", business and is not 
therefore, ultra vires. 
The ordinance in question is not ultra vires. In the case 
of Ritholz vs. City of Salt Lake, cited as 3 Utah 2nd 38~ 
284 Pacific 2nd 704, this court held that a city ordinanc; 
prohibiting price advertising of prescription eyeglasses 
was invalid. The Ritholz case was held to be controllino 
b 
by the lower court in this present appeal. In regard to the 
issues as to whether the ordinance was ultra vires in the 
Ritholz case, the court said it was void for unreasonable-
ness but that the city had authority to regulate a "par-
ticular calling or business" and never did specifically hold 
that the ordinance was ultra vires: 
" . . . The court has generally adhered to a policy of 
rather strictly limiting the extension of the powers 
of a city by implication. Plaintiff urges that because 
of this commitment we should hold the ordinance 
invalid since there is no express authority delegated 
to the city relative to advertising eyeglasses. It~ 
pointed out, however, that the powers relied on by 
the city in enacting this ordinance are the expressly 
delegated powers to 'license, tax and regulate ... the 
business conducted by merchants, wholesales and re· 
tailers, shopkeepers and storekeepers . .. ' (emphasis 
added), to preserve the safety, health and morals.of 
the city and to safeguard the general health of them· 
habitants. We stated in Ogden City vs. Leo that, 
'where the power to regulate a particular calling.or 
business is conferred on a city, it authorizes such c1fy 
to prescribe and enforce all such proper and reason· 
able rules and regulations as may be deemed neces· 
13 
sary and wholesome in conducting the business in a 
proper and orderly manner.' 
In this particular context the power to regulate bus-
iness can mean only such regulations as are reason-
able and substantially related to the safeguarding of 
the public health which raises the question whether 
the advertising prescribed by the ordinance bears 
such a relation." 
It should be noted that in the above cited holding, the 
Court was there faced with the health provision of the 
statute while in the instant case we are dealing with the 
general welfare and prosperity clause portion of the 
statute and the same principle must be applied to both 
portions of the statute. Therefore, it must be conceded 
that the ordinance is not ultra vires per se; the ordinance 
must be found to be an unreasonable and improper reg-
ulation of business to fail. 
The city, in enacting the present ordinance relies on 
the expressly delegated powers to "license, tax and reg-
ulate . . . the business conducted by merchants, whole-
salers and retailers, shopkeepers and storekeepers ... ", 
''as are necessary and proper to provide for the safety 
and preserve the health and promote the prosperity, im-
prove the morals, peace and good order, comfort and con-
venience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for 
the protection of property therein ... ". For the ordinance 
in question to be ultra vires, it must be found that the city 
did not have the express or implied power to "license, tax 
or regulate" the "particular calling or business" covered 
by the ordinance in question. The issue as to whether the 
instant ordinance is such "reasonable and proper regula-
tion" as may be "deemed necessary and wholesome in 
14 
conducting the business in a proper and orderly manner" 
is a valid question running to whether the ordinance 
18 
arbitrary or unreasonable regulation of an expressly 
delegated authority and is not an ultra vires issue strictl\' 
speaking in the modern use of the term as defined b~ 
Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, 1951, page 1692.: 
"Ultra Vires. While the phrase 'ultra vires' has been 
used to designate, not only acts beyond the express 
and implied powers of a corporation, but also acts. 
contrary to public policy or contrary to some express 
statute prohibiting them, the latter class of acts io 
now termed illegal and the 'ultra vires' confined tc, 
the former class." 
(b) The courts are bound by a strong presumption of 
validity of a municipal ordinance. 
In the case of Ogden City vs. Leo, 55 Utah 556, 182 Pa· 
cific 532, it was held that a city ordinance regulating res-
taurants or public eating places was valid and this court 
there cited the general rule as related to presumption of 
validity of a municipal ordinance: 
"It is generally presumed that conditions exist which 
make ordinances necessary or proper for the wel-
fare of the community." 
See also McCune vs. City of Phoenix, 317 Pacific 2nci 
537, 83 Arizona 98; 62 CJS Municipal Corporation Section 
208; McClain vs. City of South Pasadena, 318 Pacific 2nd 
199, 155 Ca. 2nd 423; City of Portland vs. Stevens, m 
Pacific 2nd 173, 180 Oregon 514. 
It has been argued in some of the cases, Salt Lake City 
vs. Revene, 124 Pacific 2nd 537, 101 Utah 504, and Rithoh 
15 
vs. City of Salt Lake, 3 Utah 2nd 385, 284 Pacific 2nd 702; 
that the ordinances should be strictly construed as to the 
untra vires question. A close reading of the just cited 
cases and the Leo vs. Ogden City case cited supra and the 
cases citing the general rule that a "presumption of va-
lidity" of an ordinance, clearly indicate that the general 
rule of strictly construing ordinances and statutes passed 
!1v cities operating under delegated powers is a rule ap-
plicable only under such conditions where there is no ex-
press or implied delegated power to "license, tax and reg-
ulate" a "certain calling or business". For example if a 
statute expressly authorized a city to license merchants, 
but said nothing about regulating them, the ordinance 
regulating merchants through the licensing power would 
be .strictly construed, but an ordinance allowing a license 
fee would carry with it a presumption of validity unless 
it was clearly shown that the license fee was unreason-
able. 
Thus in the instant case the closing business ordinance 
of Salt Lake City is authorized under the expressly dele-
gated power to "regulate" a "particular calling or bus-
iness" and said ordinance must be presumed to be neces-
sary for the welfare of the community unless and until 
it is clearly shown to be an unreasonable regulation or 
in violation of constitutional rights. 
This court in the Salt Lake City vs. Revene case cited 
supra is authority for the above. There is some confusion 
created by dictum in the opinion and in this case, the 
court held that: 
" ... an ordinance fixing hours of a barber shop bus-
iness was not a reasonable regulation of said business 
~ f I 
;:mdLPncein\alidintkit \l;, ,,1,i,,,1,, 
, (. r I rt,, 
sonaL!e reiationsh1p to the protcct10n ' t the pui1iir 
The court distinguished between hours of regulation ut 
a butcher shop as being reasonable and the regulation (Ji 
hours of a barber shop as being unreasonable. ThP coui: 
was undoubtedly correct m such a distmctwn. llnfor-
tunatelv, hnwcq r. the\· added the followinu . . ~ 
" ... \Vhile we think tl:r_ question not treF fmi. 
doubt. we elect to follo\\' tfw ]inf' of case~ ::ib( '.e '"' 
nut e.~/;L'ciall,- m \ iew nf 11" pn1H 1ple n .. 1t <d'\ LL 
reasonable '>Ubst~mtial doubt conu.'rnmt; the 1·ri,. 
ence of the powtJr (emphasis added l is re~oll·ed bi 
the courts against the corporat10n (city 1 and thf 
power denied. 1 Dillon. Municipal Corporation. 5tr 
edition, page 449, Section 237." 
It is obvious that this rule is a correct rule. but rs 1~1 
applicable m the barbershop casl' as well as in the instant 
case. The f'Xistence of the power tu regubt( \\·a-; 11r·t ~Pinc 
questioned. only the reasonableness. In tlw bt1tdie ~hop 
case, the court thought it \\'cb reasonable regutati(ln. ht' 
unreasonable in the barber shop ca.-,e. 
Where there is an~· 'fair, reasonable. substantial doub1 
concernini-; the exi:>tencc of the power itself the pre.;ump· 
tion is that there is no power but where tlw pO\\·er ht\· 
pressly delegated such as the power to "regulate" a "par 
ticular calling or business ... there is a presumption that 
the ordinar. :e 1s valid and may Lr' .iecl&rcr! im·alhl .,,J 
b} a clear .-.;Lowmg that it is ,n: llnreCJsonJl:le rPgul~ 11 • 1 
and 01 unconstitut1011c1l. 
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It also has been argued that although there is an ex-
'Jressly delegated authority to "regulate" a "particular 
calling or business" there is no express authority for a 
closing business sale ordinance and hence no presump-
tion. Therefore the ordinance should be strictly con-
strued. In the Salt Lake City vs. Bennion Gas & Oil Com-
pany, 80 Utah 53, 15 Pacific 2nd 648; a city ordinance was 
attacked which provided for the charging of fees for in-
spection of oil and gas business. The court there held: 
''It is not necessary that the statute should specifical-
ly give to the municipality power to charge and 
collect a fee to cover the cost of inspection and reg-
ulation. Where the authority is lodged in the munici-
pality to inspect and regulate, the further authority 
to charge a reasonable fee to cover the cost of the in-
spection and regulation will be implied." 
The following authorities are also cited as holding that 
the courts were bound by a strong presumption of valid-
ity of a municipal ordinance. Hopkins vs. Galland Mer-
cantile Laundry Company, 21Pacific2nd 553, (California 
1933); Sunny Slope Water Company vs. City of Pasa-
dena, 33 Pacific 2nd 672 (California 1934); Skalko vs. 
City of Sunnyvale, 91 Pacific 2nd 166, 93 Pacific 2nd 93 
(California 1939); City of Spokane vs. Coon, 100 Pacific 
2nd 36, (Washington 1940). 
Also in State vs. Atchison reported in 92 Kansas 431, 
140 Pacific 873, Ann. Cas. 1916 bat page 504 states: 
"It is generally presumed that conditions exist which 
make ordinances necessary and proper for the wel-
fare of the community." 
18 
The same thought is expressed in another form in 
Seattle vs. Hurst, 15 Washington 424, 97 Pacific 454; 18 
LRA NS) 169, where the following language is adopted 
from Herr and Bennis Municipal Police Ordinance Sec-
tion 127: 
"An ordinance to be void for unreasonableness must 
be plainly and clearly unreasonable. There must be 
evidence of weight." 
(c) That Salt Lake City ordinance Title 20 Chapter 5 
covering licensing of "Closing Out Sale" serves a 
definite purpose in protecting the consumer public 
and business community and therefore promotes 
the public welfare. 
Salt Lake City's ordinance regulating "Closing Out 
Sales" is very narrow in its application. To the bona-fide 
business man who is desirous of legitimately closing up 
shop, the ordinance causes no burden. The very nature 
of the ordinance is to protect the public and the business 
community from individuals who would defraud the 
consumer. The ordinance in no way regulates the method 
or manner of sale, it merely fixes a reasonable time in 
which to complete the sale, designates the goods which 
may be sold as the goods on hand or ordered in the mer· 
chant's inventory and the sale advertising material and 
method. The ordinance in no way controls operation of 
the business or of a sale by a business which is not being 
discontinued. 
For many years past, it has been an obviously recog· 
nized fact that a "Closing Out Sale" is a consumer's op· 
portunity to purchase merchandise at a bargain; that the 
merchant has decided to liquidate his inventory in the 
quickest and most efficient way by reducing prices to his 
cost or even below so that all merchandise, even that 
which is slow to move, will be sold without continuing in 
ousiness and incurring high overhead with a diminishing 
return due to a limited inventory. 
In the past the community has witnessed an imposition 
upon the consuming public and businessmen by the indi-
vidual or company who is in the "going out of business", 
business. It is expected that, when a merchant "quits" 
business or vacates a selling location, the merchandise to 
be sold is of like quality to that which was sold in estab-
lishing the general reputation of the business. Unprin-
cipled individuals have therefore taken advantage of the 
public by purchasing inferior merchandise both before 
and during the sale and then selling it without disclosing 
the inferior quality. There have been many occasions 
where the inferior merchandise at closing out sales has 
been sold at the normal retail selling price maintained by 
competing merchants. The public is further prejudiced by 
the implied and generally stated fact that all sales are 
final and the consumer therefore has no recourse when 
the inferior merchandise proves non-servicable. It has 
been the experience of the community that many bus-
inesses have been established for a short duration and 
then have gone through a "going out of business sale" 
sometimes lasting a year or more. Upon reflection one can 
only conclude that the establishment of the business was 
for the sole purpose of "going out of business" thus luring 
the public to their premises by misrepresentation, while 
during such sales the display cases and shelves continue 
well stocked with the almost daily arrival of new mer-
chandise purchased to assist in "going out of business". 
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Although it would appear that the only damage is to 
the unsuspecting consumer the greater damage in the 
long run is to the business community. Should such 
fraudulent practices be allowed to continue unchecked 
the consuming public will ultimately become well ad. 
vised of the disadvantages of such sales and avoid them. 
But what about the business community? Businesses 
generally close down and quit because of two prime rea-
sons. First, the business is not economical in operation 
and generally the liabilities exceed the assets. Thus such 
"closing out sales" are to satisfy creditors. Secondly, the 
operator simply desires to quit and recoup his investment 
which he may use for retirement or new ventures. In 
either case, should the consuming public become disillu-
sioned with "closing out sales" the proceeds from sucn 
legitimate sales will be impaired. In the first instance 
the creditors may be irreparably damaged in an already 
unpleasant condition. In the second case a merchant may 
be severely harmed in that his return of capital will be at 
a considerable loss compared to the initial investment. 
A further detriment to the business community in gen· 
eral and competing businesses in particular is the divert· 
ing of consumers from reputable and established firms 
because of the unfair competition practiced by the "going 
out of business" business. 
The ordinance will promote public confidence in the 
advertising of such sales, in that it will tend to bring 
about an acceptance of such advertisements as being , 
genuine. 
The purpose therefore of the ordinance is simply to as: 
sure the public that the business is indeed "closing out. 
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An honest business man should have no complaints and 
will not be unduly regulated by the ordinance. It must 
be concluded from the above that this ordinance is a rea-
sonable and proper regulation of "quitting business 
sales" and is substantially related to the safe guarding of 
the public welfare. It also must be pointed out that the 
ordinance is not a prohibitive ordinance such as in the 
Ritholz Case but is a regulatory one affecting only those 
merchants who are making a business of "going out of 
business sales", to the detriment of the public. 
POINT III 
THE SALT LAKE CITY "CLOSING SALES" ORDI-
NANCE CONSTITUTES A VALID EXERCISE OF 
POLICE POWER AND DOES NOT DEPRIVE RE-
SPONDENTS OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 
Consistent with the instant ordinance is the following 
general rule as cited in 37 Am. Jur. Sec. 305: 
"Municipal corporations under authorized grants of 
police power emanating directly from constitutional 
provisions or from grants from the state legislature 
by way of ... specific state statutes may regulate any 
trade, occupation, calling or business, the unre-
strained pursuit of which might affect injuriously, 
the public health, morals, safety, comfort or welfare, 
or might result in fraud or imposition on the public. 
The courts have stated that regulatory powers of 
such nature are so well recognized and established 
as to be beyond question." 
The court below in the instant case held that the going 
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out of business ordinance was void basing its ru11· . . ngs on 
the law espoused m R1tholz vs. City of Salt Lake ·t, , Cle, 
supra. There this court held that: 
"We are of the opinion that it (ordinance) does no• 
~av~ any .substanti.al bearing on public health as t; 
JUst1fy this extens10n of the police power into the 
regulation of private business and the violation 1: 
the right to freely advertise in and sell one's pro~: 
erty." 
It must be pointed out that in the Ritholz case the "Or 
dinance forbids all advertising of prices of prescription 
eyewear''. 
The Ritholz case therefore can be clearly distinguisheG 
from the case at bar in that the ordinance in the Ritholz 
case has an arbitrary prohibition of advertising of prices 
for prescription eyewear; whereas in the instant case we 
have a regulatory ordinance controlling "quitting bill· 
iness sales". The standard or test which is applied to the 
question of constitutionality of an ordinance is much 
more stringent when that ordinance is a prohibitory ordi· 
nance than when it is merely regulatory. See 11 Am. Jur. 
Section 281. 
In the case of Eskind vs. City of Vero Beach, 159 South 
2nd 209, the Florida Supreme Court held that a city ordi· 
nance restricting the use of outdoor advertising for rates 
of motels was unconstitutional and gave as one of the 
tests in determining the reasonableness of the ordinance 
the consideration of the: "Effect of such legislation on the 
rights of citizens from the aspect of its practical irnpacr 
The practical effect of the ordinance in the Ritholz case 
is a literal prohibition of admittedly legitimate advertis· 
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ing whereas in the present case we have a reasonable 
regulation of going out of business sale advertising. 
A New York City ordinance similar to the ordinance in 
question here was upheld in the face of an attack on its 
constitutionality. Windsor Madison Corporation vs. 
O'Connell, 172 New York Supplement 2nd 198, 9 misc. 
2nd 1087, by the New York Supreme Court and also 
People vs. Windsor Madison, 173 New York Supplement 
2nd 964. In the first of the two cases cited the New York 
C1Ly License Commissioner denied a license to conduct 
"going out of business" sale to a haberdasher who did not 
wait for issuance of license before displaying signs ap-
propriate to such sale. In determining the constitutional-
ity of the "going out of business" ordinance, the New 
York Supreme Court stated: 
"It is said that the provisions of the administrative 
code ... contravene the constitution in that they de-
prive the plaintiff of property without due process 
and interfere with its right of speech. The plaintiff 
is not deprived of any property, nor is any property 
right interfered with. It is not being restricted in sale 
of its goods nor is it being limited in respect to prices 
it may charge. The only restriction is on calling its 
sales a closing out sale or giving it some similar desig-
nation. 
No property right is involved. Nor is free speech, ex-
cept in a fanciful sense, concerned in the problem. 
It is well recognized that the police power extends 
to the regulation of advertising that may mislead the 
public. The conditions which gave rise to the code 
article are well known. The public was being induced 
by unscrupulous merchants to make purchases under 
the belief that stocks of goods were being sold at 
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sacrifice prices. A favored device was by distress . 
vertising displayed on the store that the proprie~d 
was going out of business for one cause or anothe
0! 
To prevent fraud by limiting such sales to instancei 
where the representations were bona fide is not an 
interference with free speech." (Emphasis added) 
In the case of People vs. Windsor Madison, 173 New 
York Supplement 2nd 964, a case arising out of the same 
ordinance and the same occasion as the above cited case 
the New York Magistrate speaking in that case states as 
follows: 
"The statute does not interfere with defendantc , 
right to sell its goods, nor does it impair its freedom 
to determine the price at which it will sell them The 
restrictions imposed by the statute are no more dras· 
tic than is reasonable to accomplish the end for which 
the law was adopted. 
The court goes on to say: 
"It follows therefore the enforcement of the statute 
here in question constitutes a valid exercise of a valid 
police power and does not deprive defendant of 
property without due process of law." 
Also applicable to the issue here is the general rule of 
law as stated in 11 Am. Jur. Sec. 281 in regard to the con· 
stitutionality of regulation of auction sales: 
"The state may forbid auction sales at certain times 
such as at night, and in certain places, particularly 
with reference to such types of merchandise as jewel· 
ry, and may in other instances hedge about such 
transactions with regulations conducive to the pre· 
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vention of imposition. In any event such fraud pre-
venting regulation must be reasonable, and if regula-
tion alone will afford the requisite protection, abso-
lute prohibition is unconstitutional." (See also 53 
ALR 2nd 1433 and 39 ALR 760, 766) 
CONCLUSION 
The power relied on by Salt Lake City in enacting the 
"closing sale" ordinance is the expressly delegated power 
to. 'license, tax and regulate ... the business conducted 
by merchants ... to provide for the peace and good order, 
comfort and convenience", of the public. 
Under this delegated authority there is no question 
that the ordinance is not ultra vires but is clearly within 
the police powers extended to Salt Lake City by statute. 
There is no question that this regulatory ordinance is 
an expressly delegated power and unless found to be an 
unreasonable and improper regulation of an expressly 
delegated authority cannot fail by reason of being ultra 
vires. 
As to the issue of reasonableness of the regulation in 
the case of an expressly delegated authority as we have 
here the court is bound by strong presumption of validity 
and as quoted supra from the Ogden City vs. Leo: 
"It is generally presumed that the conditions exist 
which make ordinances necessary or proper for the 
welfare of the community". 
The imposition on the public of those who make a bus-
iness of "going out of business" is a "substantial" evil 
which the present ordinance reasonably regulates and 
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must be presumed to be necessary for the welfare of the 
community. Although in the instant case Respondents in 
their advertisement pertaining to prices and commodities · 
practiced no fraud or falsehood and were actually closing 
business within a 90 day period the advertisement was 
directed at taking advantage of the drawing power to the 
public of a "going out of business" sale when in fact the 
sole purpose was other than a completely bona fide "Quit- 1 
ting business" sale. 
The New York Supreme Court held a similar New 
York City Ordinance constitutional as a reasonable ex-
tension of the police power noting that the ordinance 
only forbids the merchant calling his sale a "closing sale 
unless he conforms to the ordinance. 
In taking into consideration the balance between the 
imposition on the public and the limitation on constitu· 
tional rights by not allowing Respondents to call their 
sale a "closing sale" or some other similar designation 1 
without compliance with the instant ordinance, is clearly 
weighted in favor of the welfare and prosperity of the 
community at large and therefore should be held to be a 
constitutional and valid exercise of the police power by 
Salt Lake City. 
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